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Abstract 
The rate of time preference (RTP) has traditionally not been regarded as an important source of 
economic fluctuations. In this paper, I show that it is an important factor influencing economic 
fluctuations because households must have an expected RTP for the representative household 
(RTP RH) to behave optimally. Because it is impossible for a household to know the intrinsic 
RTP RH, it cannot know the parameters of the structural model of the RTP RH. Without a 
structural model, a household must use its beliefs to generate an expected RTP RH. As a result, 
the expected value can change more frequently than the intrinsic RTP RH. Because households 
often change their beliefs about their expected future paths, economic fluctuations caused by 
time preference shocks also can occur more frequently in an economy than previously thought. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The rate of time preference (RTP) plays an essential role in economic activities, and its 
importance has been emphasized since the era of Irving Fisher (Fisher, 1930). One of the most 
important equations in economics is the steady state condition 
 
rθ  ,                                 (1) 
 
where θ is RTP and r is the real rate of interest. This condition is a foundation of both static and 
dynamic economic studies. In this sense, the mechanisms of both θ and r are equally important. 
Although the mechanism of r (i.e., how r is determined) has been widely studied, RTP has not 
necessarily been regarded as an essential subject of economic research. For example, only 
factors that affect r (e.g., technology shocks or monetary shocks) have been studied as a source 
of economic fluctuations. RTP has been generally neglected because it has been widely believed 
that RTP is merely an intrinsically constant parameter. Some have argued that RTP is 
changeable even over short periods (e.g., Uzawa, 1968; Epstein and Hynes, 1983; Lucas and 
Stokey, 1984; Parkin, 1988; Obstfeld, 1990; Becker and Mulligan, 1997), but little attention has 
been given to these discussions. If RTP is truly constant and given exogenously, there may be 
little room for further meaningful research on the topic because shocks on RTP would not exist 
and would therefore not be an important source of economic fluctuations. Conversely, if RTP is 
not constant and is able to change frequently, current economic theories may have to be 
substantially rethought. In this case, RTP would have to be examined as an important source of 
economic fluctuations because the RTP, as the discount factor for future utility, is an essential 
element in economic activities. 
 In dynamic macroeconomic models, the RTP of the representative household (hereafter, 
RTP RH) matters. It has usually been assumed to be a constant parameter representing the RTPs 
of all households, usually the average RTP of all households. However, as Becker (1980) and 
Harashima (2014) showed, this assumption is impossible in dynamic models unless the RTPs of 
all households are also assumed to be identical. Otherwise, there is no state where all optimality 
conditions of all households are satisfied. The assumption of identical RTPs is problematic 
because this assumption is not merely expedient for the sake of simplicity; rather, it is a critical 
requirement that allows for an assumed representative household. Therefore, the rationale for 
the assumption of identical RTPs should be validated because it is unquestionably not identical 
among households. Hence, the indispensable nature of the assumption of identical RTPs leads to 
questions about the validity of studies based on dynamic models that define the representative 
household as the average household. 
 In this paper, I present an alternative definition of the representative household that can 
be used in dynamic models (see Harashima, 2014). This new definition, however, leads to the 
important requirement that each household must ex ante know the RTP RH to achieve 
optimality. The traditional definition (i.e., the representative household as the average 
household) allows the assumption that each household behaves without considering other 
households’ optimality. That is, there is no need to ex ante know the RTP of the representative 
household as well as the RTPs of other households, assuming that the ex post aggregates are 
consistent with the representative household’s behavior and the RTP RH. In contrast, the 
alternative definition necessitates that all households must ex ante know the RTP RH for them to 
optimize their behavior. Otherwise, the ex post aggregates cannot be consistent with the 
representative household’s behavior. Hence, each household must ex ante generate an expected 
RTP RH to optimize its objectives. 
 This necessity, however, produces its own set of problems. The structural model of the 
RTP RH should be known to households for them to rationally generate an expected RTP RH 
because RTP is intrinsically temporally variable and rational expectations are model-consistent 
expectations. Although a household knows its own RTP, it has to generate the expected RTP RH. 
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Several endogenous RTP models have been presented, the most well-known of which is that of 
Uzawa (1968). However, Uzawa’s model has not necessarily been regarded as a realistic 
expression of RTP endogeneity because it has a serious drawback in that impatience increases as 
income, consumption, and utility increase. In this paper, an alternative structural model of RTP 
is presented that does not suffer from this drawback. 
 There is another critical obstacle. Although a household knows its own RTP, it has 
almost no information about RTPs of all of the other households or of the RTP RH. Hence, a 
household must use its beliefs about the RTP RH to form its expected RTP RH. Households may 
behave based on bounded rationality and use heuristics in this type of situation. As a result, even 
if the intrinsic RTP RH does not change, the expected RTP RH can change if the household’s 
belief changes. Therefore, it is likely that households’ expected RTP change more frequently 
than the intrinsic RTP RH, i.e., time preference shocks occur more frequently than has been 
previously thought. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows that the representative household 
defined as the average household is impossible to use in dynamic models, and an alternative 
definition is presented. Section 3 shows that the necessity of households having an expected 
RTP RH to achieve optimality is also discussed. In Section 4, a structural model of RTP is 
developed. In Section 5, I show that the structural model cannot be used because households 
cannot know the intrinsic RTP RH, and that households must generate an expected RTP RH 
based on beliefs. Therefore, time preference shocks occur more frequently than has been 
traditionally thought. Finally, I offer concluding remarks in Section 6. 
 
2  THE REPRESENTATIVE HOUSEHOLD 
 
2.1  The representative household in dynamic models 
2.1.1  The assumption of the representative household 
The concept of the representative household is a necessity in macroeconomic studies. It is used 
as a matter of course, but its theoretical foundation is fragile. The representative household has 
been used given the assumption that all households are identical or that there exists one specific 
individual household, the actions of which are always average among households (I call such a 
household “the average household” in this paper). The assumption that all households are 
identical seems to be too strict; therefore, it is usually assumed explicitly or implicitly that the 
representative household is the average household. However, the average household can exist 
only under very strict conditions. Antonelli (1886) showed that the existence of an average 
household requires that all households have homothetic and homogeneous utility functions. This 
type of utility function is not usually assumed in macroeconomic studies because it is very 
restrictive and unrealistic. If more general utility functions are assumed, however, the 
assumption of the representative household as the average household is inconsistent with the 
assumptions underlying the utility functions.  
 Nevertheless, the assumption of the representative household has been widely used, 
probably because it has been believed that the representative household can be interpreted as an 
approximation of the average household. Particularly in static models, the representative 
household can be seen to approximate the average household. However, in dynamic models, it 
is hard to accept the representative household as an approximation of the average household 
because, if RTPs of households are heterogeneous, there is no steady state where all of the 
optimality conditions of the heterogeneous households are satisfied (Becker, 1980). Therefore, 
macroeconomic studies using dynamic models are fallacious if the representative household is 
assumed to approximate the average household.  
 
2.1.2  The representative household in static models 
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Static models are usually used to analyze comparative statics. If the average household is 
represented by one specific unique household for any static state, there will be no problem in 
assuming the representative household as an approximation of the average household. Even 
though the average household is not always represented by one specific unique household in 
some states, if the average household is always represented by a household in a set of 
households that are very similar in preferences and other features, then the representative 
household assumption can be used to approximate the average household.  
 Suppose, for simplicity, that households are heterogeneous such that they are identical 
except for a particular preference. Because of the heterogeneous preference, household 
consumption varies. However, levels of consumption will not be distributed randomly because 
the distribution of consumption will correspond to the distribution of the preference. The 
consumption of a household that has a very different preference from the average will be very 
different from the average household consumption. Conversely, it is likely that the consumption 
of a household that has the average preference will nearly have the average consumption. In 
addition, the order of the degree of consumption will be almost unchanged for any static state 
because the order of the degree of the preference does not change for the given state.   
 If the order of consumption is unchanged for any given static state, it is likely that the 
household with consumption that is closest to the average consumption will also always be a 
household belonging to a group of households that have very similar preferences. Hence, it is 
possible to argue that, approximately, one specific unique household’s consumption is always 
average for any static state. Of course, it is possible to show evidence that is counter to this 
argument, particularly in some special situations, but it is likely that this conjecture is usually 
true in normal situations, and the assumption that the representative household approximates the 
average household is acceptable in static models. 
 
2.1.3  The representative household in dynamic models 
In dynamic models, however, the story is more complicated. In particular, heterogeneous RTPs 
pose a serious problem. This problem is easily understood in a dynamic model with exogenous 
technology (i.e., a Ramsey growth model). Suppose that households are heterogeneous in RTP, 
degree of risk aversion (ε), and productivity of the labor they provide. Suppose also for 
simplicity that there are many “economies” in a country, and an economy consists of a 
household and a firm. The household provides labor to the firm in the particular economy, and 
the firm’s level of technology (A) varies depending on the productivity of labor that the 
household in its economy provides. Economies trade with each other: that is, the entire 
economy of a country consists of many individual small economies that trade with each other.  
 A household maximizes its expected utility,    dtθtcuE t 

exp
0
, subject to 
 
 
  ttt ckfk  , where  u  is the utility function;  f  is the production function; θ is 
RTP; E is the expectation operator; 
t
t
t
L
Y
y  , 
t
t
t
L
K
k  , and 
t
t
t
L
C
c  ; Yt (≥ 0) is output, Kt (≥ 0) 
is capital input, Lt (≥ 0) is labor input, and Ct (≥ 0) is consumption in period t. The optimal 
consumption path of this Ramsey-type growth model is   
 
 









  θ
k
y
ε
c
c
t
t
t
t 1

 , 
 
and at steady state, 
 
θ
k
y
t
t 


 .                               (2) 
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Therefore, at steady state, the heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion (ε) is irrelevant, and 
the heterogeneity in productivity does not result in permanent trade imbalances among 
economies because 
t
t
k
y


in all economies is kept equal by market arbitrage. Hence, 
heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion and productivity does not matter at steady state. 
Therefore, the same logic as that used for static models can be applied. Approximately, one 
specific unique household’s consumption is always average for any time in dynamic models, 
even if the degree of risk aversion and the productivity are heterogeneous. Thus, the assumption 
of the representative household is also acceptable in dynamic models even if the degree of risk 
aversion and the productivity are heterogeneous. 
 However, equation (2) clearly indicates that heterogeneity in RTP is problematic. As 
Becker (1980) shows, if RTP is heterogeneous, the household that has the lowest RTP will 
eventually possess all capital. With heterogeneous RTPs, there is no steady state where all 
households achieve all of their optimality conditions. In addition, the household with 
consumption that is average at present has a very different RTP from the household with 
consumption that is average in the distant future. The consumption of a household that has the 
average RTP will initially be almost average, but in the future the household with the lowest 
RTP will be the one with consumption that is almost average. That is, the consumption path of 
the household that presently has average consumption is notably different from that of the 
household with average consumption in the future. Therefore, any individual household cannot 
be almost average in any period and thus cannot even approximate the average household. As a 
result, even if the representative household is assumed in a dynamic model, its discounted 
expected utility    dtθtcuE t 

exp
0
 is meaningless, and analyses based on it are 
fallacious.  
  If we assume that RTP is identical for all households, the above problem is solved. 
However, this solution is still problematic because that assumption is not merely expedient for 
the sake of simplicity; rather, it is a critical requirement to allow for an assumed representative 
household. Therefore, the rationale for identical RTPs should be validated; that is, it should be 
demonstrated that identical RTPs are actually and universally observed. RTP is, however, 
unquestionably not identical among households. Hence, it is difficult to accept the 
representative household assumption in dynamic models based on the assumption of identical 
RTP. 
 The conclusion that the representative household assumption in dynamic models is 
meaningless and leads to fallacious results is very important, because a huge number of studies 
have used the representative household assumption in dynamic models. To solve this severe 
problem, an alternative interpretation or definition of the representative household is needed. 
 Note that in an endogenous growth model the situation is even more complicated. 
Because a heterogeneous degree of risk aversion also matters, the assumption of the 
representative household is more difficult to accept, so an alternative interpretation or definition 
is even more important when endogenous growth models are used. 
 
2.2  Sustainable heterogeneity 
2.2.1  The model 
Suppose that two heterogeneous economies―economy 1 and economy 2—are identical except 
for their RTPs. Households within each economy are assumed to be identical for simplicity. The 
population growth rate is zero. The economies are fully open to each other, and goods, services, 
and capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. 
 Each economy can be interpreted as representing either a country (the international 
interpretation) or a group of identical households in a country (the national interpretation). 
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Because the economies are fully open, they are integrated through trade and form a combined 
economy. The combined economy is the world economy in the international interpretation and 
the national economy in the national interpretation. In the following discussion, a model based 
on the international interpretation is called an international model and that based on the national 
interpretation is called a national model. Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used 
only for the international transactions. However, because both national and international 
interpretations are possible, this concept and terminology are also used for the national models 
in this paper. 
 RTP of household in economy 1 is 
1θ  and that in economy 2 is θ2, and θ1 < θ2. The 
production function in economy 1 is  ,t
α
,t kfAy 11   and that in economy 2 is 
 ,t
α
,t kfAy 22  , where yi,t and ki,t are, respectively, output and capital per capita in economy i 
in period t for i = 1, 2; A is technology; and α  10  α  is a constant. The population of each 
economy is 
2
L
; thus, the total for both is L, which is sufficiently large. Firms operate in both 
economies. The current account balance in economy 1 is τt and that in economy 2 is –τt. The 
production functions are specified as  
 
 α
ti,
α
i,t kAy
 1  ; 
 
thus,    2,11,, 
 iALKY
αα
titi
. Because A is given exogenously, this model is an exogenous 
technology model (Ramsey growth model). The examination of sustainable heterogeneity based 
on an endogenous growth model is shown in Appendix.  
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each economy are 
kept equal through arbitration, such that  
 
,t
,t
,t
,t
k
y
k
y
2
2
1
1





 .                             (3) 
 
Because equation (3) always holds through arbitration, equations 
tt kk ,2,1  , tt kk ,2,1
  , 
tt yy ,2,1  , and tt yy ,2,1    also hold.  
 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s0  mirrors capital flows between the two 
economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the other economy. 
Because 













t
t
t
t
k
y
k
y
,2
,2
,1
,1  are returns on investments, dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t


0
,1
,1  and dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t


0
,2
,2  
represent income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other economy. 
Hence,  
 
dsτ
k
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t 


0
,2
,2  
 
is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
 
t
t
s
t
t
τdsτ
k
y



0
,1
,1  
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is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the 
economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies, such that  
 
  ,t,tt ,kkκτ 21  . 
 
 The government (or an international supranational organization) intervenes in the 
activities of economies 1 and 2 by transferring money from economy 1 to economy 2. The 
amount of transfer in period t is gt, and it is assumed that gt depends on capital inputs, such that  
 
,tt kgg 1 ,
 
 
where g  is a constant. Because tt kk ,2,1   and tt kk ,2,1
  , 
 
 
,t,tt kgkgg 21   . 
 
 Each household in economy 1 therefore maximizes its expected utility 
 
    dttθcuE t 1
0
,11 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
  ,tt
t
s
α
,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
t kgτdsτkAαckAk 1
0
11
1
1,1 1  
  ,             (4) 
 
and each household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 
    dttθcuE t 2
0
,22 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
  tt
t
s
α
t
α
,t
α
t
α
t kgτdsτkAαckAk ,2
0
,22
1
,2,2 1  
  ,             (5) 
 
where ui,t and ci,t, respectively, are the utility function and per capita consumption in economy i 
in period t for i = 1, 2; and E is the expectation operator. Equations (4) and (5) implicitly assume 
that each economy does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 
2.2.2  Sustainable heterogeneity without government intervention 
Heterogeneity is defined as being sustainable if all of the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. First, the natures of the model when the 
government does not intervene (i.e., 0g ) are examined. The growth rate of consumption in 
economy 1 is 
 
      












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 
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1
1
0
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1
0
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,1 111 θ
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τ
dsτkAαα
k
dsτ
kAαkAαε
c
c
,t
t
t
s
α
t
α
,t
t
s
α
t
αα
t
α
t
t

 . 
 
Hence,  
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and thereby  
 
      0111lim 11 


θΞΨαkAα α,t
α
t
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where 
t
t
t
t
t
t k
τ
k
τ
Ξ
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limlim

  and 
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t
s
t
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s
t k
dsτ
k
dsτ
Ψ
2
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1
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y
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0limlim
1
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t
t
t
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,t
t τ
τ
k
k 
, and Ψ is constant at steady state because k1,t and τt are constant; thus, 
t
t
t k
τ
Ξ
,1
lim

  is constant at steady state. For Ψ to be constant at steady state, it is necessary that 
0lim 

t
t
τ  and thus 0Ξ . Therefore,  
 
      0111lim 11 


θΨαkAα α,t
α
t
 ,                   (6) 
 
and 
 
     0111lim 22 


θΨαkAα α,t
α
t
                    (7) 
 
because  
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 Because      11 111lim θΨαkAα
α
,t
α
t
 

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t
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
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
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.1
,1 , then  
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t
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Ψ
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lim12

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
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
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 .                         (8) 
 
By equations (6) and (8),  
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thus,  
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



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
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 .                       (9) 
 
If equation (9) holds, all of the optimality conditions of both economies are indefinitely satisfied. 
The state indicated by equation (9) is called the “multilateral steady state” or “multilateral state” 
in the following discussion. By procedures similar to those used for the endogenous growth 
model in Appendix, the condition of the multilateral steady state for H economies that are 
identical except for their RTPs is shown as  
 
H
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y
H
q
q
i.t
i,t
t

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
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 1
lim                             (10) 
 
for any i, where i = 1, 2, … , H.  
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    
0
1
lim12 21
21
.1
,1
21 









θθα
θθ
k
y
α
θθ
Ψ
t
t
t
 
 
by equation (9), then by 0lim
1
0



Ψ
k
dsτ
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t
s
t
, 
 
 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
; 
 
that is, economy 1 possesses accumulated debts owed to economy 2 at steady state, and 
economy 1 has to export goods and services to economy 2 by 
 
  dsτkAα
t
s
α
t
α


0
,11  
 
in every period to pay the debts. Nevertheless, because 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0Ξ , the debts do 
not explode but stabilize at steady state. Because of the debts, the consumption of economy 1 is 
smaller than that of economy 2 at steady state under the condition of sustainable heterogeneity.  
 Note that many empirical studies conclude that RTP is negatively correlated with 
income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003). Suppose that, in addition to the 
heterogeneity in RTP (θ1 < θ2), the productivity of economy 1 is higher than that of economy 2. 
At steady state, the consumption of economy 1 would be larger than that of economy 2 as a 
result of the heterogeneity in productivity. However, as a result of the heterogeneity in RTP, the 
consumption of economy 1 is smaller than that of economy 2 at steady state under sustainable 
heterogeneity. Which effect prevails will depend on differences in the degrees of heterogeneity. 
For example, if the difference in productivity is relatively large whereas that in RTP is relatively 
small, the effect of the productivity difference will prevail and the consumption of economy 1 
will be larger than that of economy 2 at steady state under sustainable heterogeneity.  
 
2.2.3  Sustainable heterogeneity with government intervention 
Sustainable heterogeneity is a very different state from the one Becker (1980) described. The 
 9 
difference emerges because, in a multilateral state, economy 1 behaves by fully considering 
economy 2’s conditions. The multilateral state therefore will not be naturally selected by 
economy 1, and the path selection may have to be decided politically (see Harashima, 2010). On 
the other hand, when economy 1 behaves unilaterally, the government may intervene in 
economic activities so as to achieve, for example, social justice. 
 In this section, I show that, even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, sustainable 
heterogeneity can always be achieved with appropriate government intervention.   
 
2.2.3.1  The two-economy model 
Government intervention is first considered in the two-economy model constructed in Section 
2.2.1. If the government intervenes (i.e., 0g ),  
 
 

 




 t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
ds
dt
dsd
c
c
0
0
,1
,1
limlimlim



  . 
 
Because 0g , equations (6) and (7) are changed to   
 
     0111lim 11 


gθΨαkAα α,t
α
t
 ,                (11) 
 
and 
 
      0111lim 22 


gθΨαkAα α,t
α
t
 .                (12) 
 
If economy 1 behaves unilaterally such that equation (11) is satisfied, then  
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and 
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At the same time, if economy 2 behaves unilaterally such that equation (12) is satisfied, then  
 
 0lim
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t
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By equations (11) and (12) 
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because 
,t,t kk 21  . In addition,  
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This equation is identical to equation (9) and is satisfied at the multilateral steady state. 
Therefore,  
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If g  is set equal to equation (13), all optimality conditions of both economies 1 and 2 are 
satisfied even though economy 1 behaves unilaterally.   
 There are various values of Ψ, depending on the initial consumption economy 1 sets. If 
economy 1 behaves in such a way as to make 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
, and particularly, make g = 0 
such that 
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2 1
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then 
 
 
 
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t
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Ψ
.1
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lim12






                          (14) 
 
by equation (13). Equation (14) is identical to equation (8); that is, the state where equation (14) 
is satisfied is identical to the multilateral state with no government intervention (i.e., g = 0). 
On the other hand, if economy 1 behaves in such a way as to make 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
, 
 
 0
2
12 


θθ
g  . 
 
This condition is identical to that for sustainable heterogeneity with government intervention in 
the endogenous growth model shown by Harashima (2012). Furthermore, if economy 1 behaves 
in such a way as to make 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
, g is positive and is given by equation (13). 
 There are various steady states, depending on the values of 
,t
t
s
t k
dsτ
Ψ
1
0
lim


  and the 
initial consumption set by economy 1. Nevertheless, at any steady state that satisfies equation 
(14), all of the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied (by government intervention, all 
optimality conditions of economy 2 are also satisfied). For economy 1, all steady states are 
equally optimal. Economy 1 selects one of the steady states (i.e., sets the initial consumption); 
for example, it may select the one that gives the highest expected utility, the highest steady state 
consumption, or some values based on other criteria. Note, however, that an overly large 
positive Ψ requires zero initial consumption and thus a certain upper bound of Ψ will exist.  
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2.2.3.2  The multi-economy model 
In this section, for simplicity, only the case of 0lim
1
0



,t
t
s
t k
dsτ
Ψ  is considered. It is 
assumed that there are H economies that are identical except for their RTPs. If H = 2, when 
sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, economies 1 and 2 consist of a combined economy 
(economy 1+2) with twice the population and a RTP of 
2
21 θθ  . Suppose there is a third 
economy with a RTP of θ3. Because economy 1+2 has twice the population of economy 3, if 
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By iterating similar procedures, if government transfer between economy H and economy 1+2+ 
∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is such that  
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for any i (= 1, 2, ∙ ∙ ∙, H).  
 
2.3  An alternative definition of the representative household 
2.3.1  The definition 
Section 2.2 indicates that, when sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, all heterogeneous 
households are connected (in the sense that all households behave by considering other 
households’ optimality) and appear to be behaving collectively as a combined supra-household 
that unites all households, as equations (9) and (10) indicate. The supra-household is unique and 
its behavior is time-consistent. Its actions always and consistently represent those of all 
households. Considering these natures of households under sustainable heterogeneity, I present 
the following alternative definition of the representative household: “the behavior of the 
representative household is defined as the collective behavior of all households under 
sustainable heterogeneity.” 
 Even if households are heterogeneous, they can be represented by a representative 
household as defined above. Unlike the representative household defined as the average 
household, the collective representative household reaches a steady state where all households 
satisfy all of their optimality conditions in dynamic models. In addition, this representative 
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household has a RTP that is equal to the average RTP as shown in equations (9) and (10).
1
 
Hence, we can assume not only a representative household but also that its RTP is the average 
rate of all households.  
 
2.3.2  Universality of sustainable heterogeneity 
An important point, however, is that this alternatively defined representative household can be 
used in dynamic models only if sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, but this condition is not 
necessarily always naturally satisfied. Sustainable heterogeneity is achieved only if households 
with lower RTPs behave multilaterally or the government appropriately intervenes. Therefore, 
the representative household assumption is not necessarily naturally acceptable in dynamic 
models unless it is confirmed that sustainable heterogeneity is usually achieved in an economy.  
 Notwithstanding this flaw, the representative household assumption has been widely 
used in many macroeconomic studies that use dynamic models. Furthermore, these studies have 
been little criticized for using the inappropriate representative household assumption. In 
addition, in most economies, the dire state that Becker (1980) predicts has not been observed 
even though RTPs of households are unquestionably heterogeneous. These facts conversely 
indicate that sustainable heterogeneity―probably with government interventions―has been 
usually and universally achieved across economies and time periods. In a sense, these facts are 
indirect evidence that sustainable heterogeneity usually prevails in economies.  
 Note that because the representative household’s behavior in dynamic models is 
represented by the collective behavior of all households under sustainable heterogeneity, RH’s 
RTP is not intrinsically known to households, but they do need to have an expected rate. Each 
household intrinsically knows its own preferences, but it does not intrinsically know the 
collective preference of all households. Therefore, in dynamic models, it must be assumed that 
all households do not ex ante know RH’s RTP, but households estimate it from information on 
the behaviors of other households and the government.  
 
3  NEED FOR AN EXPECTED RTP RH 
 
3.1  The behavior of household 
Achieving sustainable heterogeneity affects the behavior of the individual household because 
sustainable heterogeneity indicates that each household must consider the other households’ 
optimality (as well as the behavior of the government, if necessary). This feature does not mean 
that households behave cooperatively with other households. Each household behaves 
non-cooperatively based on its own RTP, but at the same time, it behaves considering whether 
the other households’ optimality conditions are achieved or not. This consideration affects the 
actions a household takes in that it affects the choice of a household’s initial consumption. 
 Sustainable heterogeneity indicates that a household’s future path of consumption has to 
be consistent with the future path of sustainable heterogeneity. Thereby, a household sets its 
initial consumption such that it will proceed on the path that is consistent with the path of 
sustainable heterogeneity and eventually reach a steady state. 
 
3.2  Deviation from sustainable heterogeneity 
3.2.1  Political elements 
What happens if a household deviates from sustainable heterogeneity? A deviation means that a 
household sets its initial consumption at a level that is not consistent with sustainable 
heterogeneity. For less advantaged households (i.e., households with higher RTPs), the only way 
to satisfy all of their optimality conditions is to set their initial consumption consistent with 
                                                   
1
 If sustainable heterogeneity is achieved with the help of the government’s intervention, the time preference rate 
of the representative household will not be exactly equal to the average rate of time preference. 
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sustainable heterogeneity. Therefore, they will not take the initiative to deviate. In contrast, the 
most advantaged households (i.e., those with the lowest RTP) can satisfy all of their optimality 
conditions even if they set initial consumption independent of sustainable heterogeneity. The 
incentive for the most advantaged household to select a multilateral path will be weak because 
the growth rate of the most advantaged household on the multilateral path is lower than that on 
the unilateral path. 
 When economy 1 selects the unilateral path, does economy 2 quietly accept the 
unfavorable consequences shown in Becker (1980)? From an economic perspective, the optimal 
response of economy 2 is the one shown in Harashima (2010): economy 2 should behave as a 
follower and accept the unfavorable consequences. However, if other factors—particularly 
political ones—are taken into account, the response of economy 2 will be different. Faced with 
a situation in which all the optimality conditions cannot be satisfied, it is highly likely that 
economy 2 would politically protest and resist economy 1. It should be emphasized economy 2 
is not responsible for its own non-optimality, which is a result of economy 1’s unilateral 
behavior in a heterogeneous population. Economy 2 may overlook the non-optimality if it is 
temporary, but it will not if it is permanent. As shown in Harashima (2010), the non-optimality 
is permanent, it is quite likely that economy 2 will seriously resist economy 1 politically.  
 If economy 1 could achieve its optimality only on the unilateral path, economy 1 would 
counter the resistance of economy 2, but this is not the case. Because of this, economy 2’s 
demand does not necessarily appear to be unreasonable or selfish. Faced with the protest and 
resistance by economy 2, economy 1 may compromise or cooperate with economy 2 and select 
the multilateral path. 
 
3.2.2  Resistance 
The main objective of economy 2 is to force economy 1 to select the multilateral path and to 
establish sustainable heterogeneity. This objective may be achieved through cooperative 
measures, non-violent civil disobedience (e.g., trade restrictions), or other more violent means. 
Restricting or abolishing trade between the two economies will cost economy 1 
because it necessitates a restructuring of the division of labor, and the restructuring will not be 
confined to a small scale. Large-scale adjustments will develop that involve all levels of divided 
labor, because they are all correlated with each other. For example, if an important industry had 
previously existed only in one economy, owing to a division of labor, and trade between the two 
economies was no longer permitted, the other economy would have to establish this industry 
while also maintaining other industries. As a result, economy 1 would incur non-negligible costs. 
More developed economies have more complicated and sophisticated divisions of labor, and 
restructuring costs from the disruption of trade will be much higher in developed economies. In 
addition, more resources will need to be allocated to the generation of technology because 
technology will also no longer be traded. Finally, all of the conventional benefits of trade will 
be lost. Trade is beneficial because of the heterogeneous endowment of resources, as the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem shows. Because goods and services are assumed to be uniform in the 
models presented in this paper, the benefits of trade are implicit in the models. However, in the 
real word, resources such as oil and other raw materials are unevenly distributed, so a disruption 
or restriction of trade will substantially damage economic activities on both national and 
international levels. 
 The damage done by trade restrictions has an upper limit, however, because the 
restructuring of the division of labor, additional resource allocation to innovation, and loss of 
trade benefits are all finite. Therefore, in some cases, particularly if economies are not 
sufficiently developed and division of labor is not complex, the damage caused will be 
relatively small. Hence, a disruption of trade (non-violent civil disobedience in the national 
models) may not be sufficiently effective as a means of resistance under some these conditions. 
In some cases, harassment, sabotage, intimidation, and violence may be used, whether 
legal or illegal. In extreme cases, war or revolution could ensue. In such cases, economy 1 will 
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be substantially damaged in many ways and be unable to achieve optimality. The resistance and 
resulting damages will continue until sustainability is established. 
 In any case, the objective of economy 2’s resistance conversely implies that establishing 
sustainability eliminates the risk and cost of political and social instability. The resistance of 
economy 2 will lower the desire of economy 1 to select the unilateral path. 
 
3.2.3  United economies 
An important countermeasure to the fragility of sustainable heterogeneity for less advantaged 
economies is the formation of a union of economies. If economies other than economy 1 are 
united by commonly selecting the multilateral path within them, their power to resist economy 1 
will be substantially enhanced. Consider the multi-economy model shown in Harashima (2010). 
If the economies do not form a union, the power to resist the unilateral actions of economy 1 is 
divided and limited to the power of each individual economy. However, if the economies are 
united, the power to resist economy 1 increases. If a sufficient number of economies unite, the 
multilateral path will almost certainly be selected by economy 1. 
 To maintain the union, any economy in the union should have the explicit and resolved 
intention of selecting the multilateral path within the union, even if it is relatively more 
advantaged within the union. To demand that relatively more advantaged economies select the 
multilateral path, less advantaged economies themselves must also select the multilateral path in 
any case. Otherwise, less advantaged economies will be divided and ruled by more advantaged 
economies. For all heterogeneous people to happily coexist, all of them should behave 
multilaterally. At the same time, Harashima (2010) indicates that the more advantaged an 
economy is, the more modestly it should behave, i.e., the more it should restrain itself from 
accumulating extra capitals. 
 In general, therefore, the most advantaged (the lowest RTP) household will be forced to 
set its initial consumption consistent with sustainable heterogeneity. 
 
3.3  Need for an expected RTP RH 
Because all households need to set their initial consumption consistent with sustainable 
heterogeneity to achieve it, households must calculate the path of sustainable heterogeneity 
before setting their initial consumption levels. To calculate this level, each household first must 
know the value of RTP RH. However, although a household naturally knows the value of its 
own RTP, it does not intrinsically know the value of RTP RH. To know this, a household would 
have to know the values of all of the other households’ RTPs. Hence, the expected value of RTP 
RH must somehow be generated utilizing all other relevant available information. The necessity 
of an expected RTP RH is critically important because RTP plays a crucial role as the discount 
factor in dynamic models. 
 Note that, if we assume that RTP is identical for all households, an expected RTP RH is 
no longer needed because any household’s own RTP is equal to the RTP RH. This solution is 
still problematic, however, because the assumption is not merely expedient for the sake of 
simplicity; rather, it is a critical requirement to eliminate the need for an expected RTP RH. 
Therefore, any rationale for assuming identical RTPs should be validated; that is, it should be 
demonstrated that identical RTPs do exist and are universally observed. However, RTP is 
unquestionably not identical among households. Therefore, households must use expected 
values of RTP RH. 
 
4  THE RTP MODEL 
 
4.1  Need to know the structural model  
If RTP RH is a constant parameter, as has been long and widely assumed, the need for an 
expected RTP RH would not be a serious problem. The historical mean of an unchanging RTP 
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RH could be estimated relatively precisely based on long-term data of various economic 
indicators even if the structural model remained unknown. The RTP RH could be specified as 
the RTP that is most consistent with long-term trends of the indicators. 
 Although RTP has been treated as a constant parameter in many studies, this feature has 
not been demonstrated either empirically or theoretically. Rather, the assumption is merely 
expedient for the sake of simplicity. There is another practical reason for this treatment: models 
with a permanently constant RTP exhibit excellent tractability (see Samuelson, 1937). However, 
some have argued that it is natural to view RTP as temporally variable, and the concept of a 
temporally varying RTP has a long history (e.g., Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Fisher, 1930). More 
recently, Lawrance (1991) and Becker and Mulligan (1997) showed that people do not inherit 
permanently constant RTPs by nature and that economic and social factors affect the formation 
of RTPs. Their arguments indicate that many incidents can affect and change RTP. Models of 
endogenous RTP have been presented, the most familiar of which is Uzawa’s (1968) model. 
 If the RTP RH is temporally variable, its future stream must be expected by households, 
and a rational expectation is a model-consistent expectation. To generate rational expectations of 
RTP RH, therefore, the structural model of the RTP RH (i.e., equations that fundamentally 
describe how it is endogenously formed) needs to be known. 
 
4.2  Endogenous RTP models 
4.2.1 Uzawa’s (1968) model 
The most well-known endogenous RTP model is that of Uzawa (1968). It has been applied in 
many analyses (e.g., Epstein and Hynes, 1983; Lucas and Stokey, 1984; Epstein, 1987; Obstfeld, 
1990). However, Uzawa’s model has not necessarily been regarded as a realistic expression of 
the endogeneity of RTP because it has a serious drawback in that impatience increases as 
income, consumption, and utility increase. The basic structure of Uzawa’s model is 
 
  tt cuθθ
 , 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0 , 
 
in which RTP in period t (θt) is temporally variable and an increasing function of present utility 
u(ct) where ct is consumption in period t. The condition 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  is necessary for the model 
to be stable. This property is quite controversial and difficult to accept a priori because many 
empirical studies have indicated that RTP is negatively correlated with permanent income (e.g., 
Lawrance, 1991); thus, many economists are critical of Uzawa’s model. Epstein (1987), 
however, discussed the plausibility of increasing impatience and offered some 
counter-arguments. However, his view is in the minority, and most economists support 
arguments in favor of a decreasing RTP, such that 
 
0
t
t
cdu
dθ
. Hence, although Uzawa’s model 
attracted some attention, the analysis of the endogeneity of RTP has progressed very little. 
Although Uzawa’s model may be flawed, it does not mean that the conjecture that RTP is 
influenced by future income, consumption, and utility is fallacious. Rather, it means that an 
appropriate model in which RTP is negatively correlated with income, consumption, and utility 
has not been presented. 
 
4.2.2 Size effect on impatience 
The problem of 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  in Uzawa’s model arises because distant future levels of 
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consumption have little influence on factors that form RTP; that is, RTP is formed only with the 
information on present consumption, and it must be revised every period in accordance with 
consumption growth. However, there is no a priori reason why information on distant future 
activities should be far less important than the information on the present and near future 
activities. Fisher (1930) argued that 
 
[O]ur first step, then, is to show how a person’s impatience depends on the size 
of his income, assuming the other three conditions to remain constant; for, 
evidently, it is possible that two incomes may have the same time shape, 
composition and risk, and yet differ in size, one being, say, twice the other in 
every period of time. 
 In general, it may be said that, other things being equal, the smaller the 
income, the higher the preference for the present over the future income. It is 
true of course that a permanently small income implies a keen appreciation of 
wants as well as of immediate wants. … But it increases the want for immediate 
income even more than it increases the want for future income. (p. 72) 
 
According to Fisher’s (1930) view, a force that influences RTP is a psychological response 
derived from the perception of the “size of the entire income or utility stream.” This view 
indicates that it is necessary to probe how people perceive the size of the entire income or utility 
stream. 
 Little effort has been directed toward probing the nature of the size of the utility or 
income stream on RTP, although numerous psychological experiments have been performed 
with regard to the anomalies of the expected utility model with a constant RTP (e.g., Frederick 
et al., 2002). Analyses using endogenous RTP models so far have merely introduced the a priori 
assumption of endogeneity of RTP without explaining the reasoning for doing so in detail. 
Hence, even now, Fisher’s (1930) insights are very useful for the examination of the size effect. 
An important point in Fisher’s quote is that the size of the infinite utility stream is perceived as 
“permanently” high or low. The size difference among the utility streams may be perceived as a 
permanently continuing difference of utilities among different utility streams. Anticipation of a 
permanently higher utility may enhance an emotional sense of well-being because people feel 
they are in a long-lasting secure situation, which will generate a positive psychological response 
and make people more patient. If that is true, distant future utilities should be taken into account 
equally with present utility. Otherwise, it is impossible to distinguish whether the difference of 
utilities will continue permanently. 
 From this point of view, the specification that only the present utility influences the 
formation of RTP, as is the case of Uzawa’s model, is inadequate. Instead, a simple measure of 
the size where present and future utilities are summed with equal weight will be a more 
appropriate measure of the size of a utility stream.
2
 
 
4.3  Model of RTP
3
 
4.3.1  The model 
The representative household solves the maximization problem as shown in Section 2.1.3. 
Taking the arguments in Section 4.2 into account, the “size” of the infinite utility stream can be 
defined as follows. 
 
Definition 1: The size of the utility stream W for a given technology A is 
 
                                                   
2 Das (2003) showed another stable endogenous time preference model with decreasing impatience. Her model is 
stable, although the rate of time preference is decreasing because endogenous impatience is almost constant. In this 
sense, the situation her model describes is very special. 
3 The idea of this type of endogenous time preference model was originally presented in Harashima (2004). 
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   
T
t
T
dtcutρEW
0
lim , 
 
where E is the expectation operator, and 
 
 
T
tρ
1
  if Tt 0  
    0tρ   otherwise.                               
 
 tρ  indicates weights and has the same value in any period. Thus, the weights for the 
evaluation of future utilities are distributed evenly over time, as discussed in Section 4.2. 
 To this point, technology A has been assumed to be constant. If A is temporally variable 
(At) and grows at a constant rate and the economy is on a balanced growth path such that At, yt, 
kt, and ct grow at the same rate, then the definition of W needs to be modified because any 
stream of ct and u(ct) grows to infinity. It is then impossible to distinguish the sizes of the utility 
stream by simply summing up ct as T  as shown in Definition 1. Because balanced 
growth is possible only when technological progress is Harrod neutral, I assume a Harrod 
neutral production function such that 
 
  1ttt kωAy , 
 
where  10   and  ωω 0  are constants. To distinguish the sizes of utility stream, 
the following value is set as the standard stream of utility, 
 
 ψtecu ~ , 
 
where  cc ~0~   is a constant and  ψψ 0  is a constant rate of growth. Streams of utility can 
be compared with this standard stream. If a constant relative risk aversion utility function is 
assumed, a stream of utility can be compared with the standard stream of utility as follows: 
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By using this ratio, a given stream of utility can be distinguished from the standard stream of 
utility. That is, the size of a utility stream W for a given stream of technology At that grows at 
the same rate ψ as yt, kt, and ct can be alternatively defined as 
 
  







T
ψt
t
T
dt
e
c
utρEW
0
lim . 
 
Clearly, if ψ = 0, then the size (W) degenerates into the one shown in Definition 1. 
 If there is a steady state such that 
 
     

 cuEcuE t
t
lim , 
 
or for the case of expected balanced growth, 
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where c* is a constant and indicates steady-state consumption, then 
 
   cuEW  
 
for the following reason. Because      

 cuEcuE t
t
lim (or 











 ψt
t
t e
c
uElim   cuE ), 
then 
 
            WcuEdtcuEcuEtρT t
T
 
 0lim  
(or         WcuEdt
e
c
uEcuEtρ
T
ψt
t
T



















 
 0lim ). 
 
In addition, 
 
         0lim
0



dtcuEcuEtρ
T
t
T
 
(or      0lim
0






















dt
e
c
uEcuEtρ
T
ψt
t
T
). 
 
Hence,    cuEW ; that is, RTP is determined by steady-state consumption (c*). 
 The RTP model presented in this paper is constructed on the basis of this measure of W. 
An essential property that must be incorporated into the model is that RTP is sensitive to, and a 
function of, W such that 
 
 Wθθ  , 
 
where  Wθ   is monotonically continuous and continuously differentiable. Because W is a 
sum of utilities, this property simply reflects the core idea of an endogenous RTP. However, this 
property is new in the sense that RTP is sensitive not only to the present utility but also to the 
entire stream of utility, that is, the size of the utility stream represented by the utility of 
steady-state consumption. This property is intuitively acceptable because it is likely that people 
set their principles or parameters for their behaviors considering the final consequences of their 
behavior (i.e., the steady state; see, e.g., Barsky and Sims, 2012). 
 Another essential property that must be incorporated into the model is 
 
0
dW
dθ
. 
 
Because    cuEW  and  
t
t
dc
cdu
0 , RTP is inversely proportionate to c*. This property is 
consistent with the findings in many empirical studies, which have shown that RTP is negatively 
correlated with permanent income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991). 
 In summary, the basic structure of the model is: 
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       cuEθWθθ , 
   0 cudE
dθ
dW
dθ
 .                            (15) 
 
This model is deceptively similar to Uzawa’s endogenous RTP model (Eq. 2) and simply 
replaces ct with c* and 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  with    0cudE
dθ
. However, the two models are 
completely different because of the opposite characteristics of 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  and    0cudE
dθ
. 
 
4.3.2  Nature of the model 
The model (Eq. 3) can be regarded as successful only if it exhibits stability. In Uzawa’s model, 
the economy becomes unstable if 
 t
t
cdu
dθ
0  is replaced with 
 
0
t
t
cdu
dθ
. In this section, I 
examine the stability of the model. 
 
4.3.2.1  Equilibrium RTP 
In Ramsey-type models, such as shown in Section 2.1.3, if a constant RTP is given, the value of 
the marginal product of capital (i.e., the value of the real interest rate) converges to that of the 
given RTP as the economy approaches the steady state. Hence, when a RTP is specified at a 
certain value, the corresponding expected steady-state consumption is uniquely determined. 
Given fixed values of other exogenous parameters, any predetermined RTP has unique values of 
expected consumption and utility at steady state. There is a one-to-one correspondence between 
the expected utilities at steady state and the RTPs; therefore, the expected utility at steady state 
can be expressed as a function of RTP. Let 

xc  be a set of steady-state consumption levels, 
given a set of RTPs (θx) and other fixed exogenous parameters. The concept of θ → W 
discussed above can be described as 
 
     WcuEθg   ,                         (16) 
 
where  xcc  and xθθ . On the other hand, RTP is a continuous function of steady-state 
consumption as shown in Eq. (15) such that        cuEθWθθ . The reverse 
function is 
 
     WcuEθh   .                         (17) 
 
 The equilibrium RTP is determined by the point of intersection of the two functions, 
 θg  and  θh , as shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the special but conventionally 
assumed case for  θh  in which θ is not sensitive to W, and RTP is constant. There exists a 
point of intersection because both  θg  and  θh  are monotonically continuous for 0θ . 
 θh  is monotonically continuous because  Wθ   is monotonically continuous.  θg  is 
monotonically continuous because, as a result of utility maximization,    k fc  and 
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 



dk
kdf 
 θ , where 
k  is capital input per capita at steady state such that  t
t
kk

  lim . 
Because  k f  and  


dk
kdf 
 are monotonically continuous for 0k , c* is a 
monotonically continuous function of θ for 0θ . Here, because u is monotonically 
continuous, then     θgcuE   is also monotonically continuous for 0θ . 
 The function      WcuEθg    is a decreasing function of θ because higher RTP 
results in lower steady state consumption. The function      WcuEθh    is also a 
decreasing function of θ because 0
dW
dθ
. Thus, both  θg  and  θh  are decreasing, but 
the slope of  θh  is steeper than that of  θg  as shown in Figure 1. This is true because 
  Wθg  is the consequence of a Ramsey-type model as shown in Section 2.1.3; thus, if 
θ , then   0Wθg  because  tiθ  and 0tk , and if 0θ , then 
  Wθg  because 0 tiθ  and tk . The function   Wθh  indicates the 
endogeneity of RTP, and because RTP is usually neither zero nor infinity, then even if 
  0Wθh , θ , and   Wθh , θ0 . Hence, the locus   Wθh  cuts the 
locus   Wθg   downward from the top, as shown in Figure 1. Hence, the locus   Wθh   
is more vertical than   Wθg  , and thereby  a permanently constant RTP, as shown in Figure 
2, has probably been used as an approximation of the locus   Wθh  for simplicity.  
 
4.3.2.2  Stability of the model 
RTP is constant unless a shock that changes the expected c* occurs because W does not depend 
on t but on the expected c*. Thus, the same RTP and steady state continue until such a shock 
hits the economy. Therefore, the endogeneity of RTP only matters when a shock occurs. This 
constancy is the key for the stability of the model (Eq. 3). Once the RTP corresponding to the 
intersection (Fig. 1) is determined, it is constant and the economy converges at a unique steady 
state unless a shock that changes the expected c* occurs. The shock is exogenous to the model, 
and the economy does not explode endogenously but stabilizes at the steady state. Hence, the 
property 0
dW
dθ
 in the model (Eq. 3), which is consistent with empirical findings, does not 
cause instability. 
 The model is therefore acceptable as a model of endogenous RTP. Furthermore, because 
RTP is endogenously determined, the assumption of irrationality is not necessary for the 
determination of RTP. Nevertheless, a shock on RTP can be initiated by a shock on the expected 
c*; thus, even if the so-called animal spirits are directly irrelevant to determination of RTP, they 
may be relevant in the generation of shocks on the expected c*. 
 
5  FREQUENT RTP SHOCKS 
 
5.1  Difficulty in knowing RTP RH  
To estimate the parameter values of Eq. (17) in the structural model of RTP RH, it is necessary 
to obtain a sufficiently large amount of data on the value of RTP RH. To obtain these data, a 
household must know the RTPs of all the other households. Although a household knows its 
own RTP, it has almost no information about the RTPs of all the other households much less 
time-series data on each household’s RTP. Because of the lack of available data, a household 
cannot estimate the parameter values in Eq. (17) in the structural model of RTP RH even if it 
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knows the functional forms of equations in the structural model.  
We can easily generate data on aggregate consumption, investment, production, 
inflation, trade, and other factors at a relatively low cost, but we cannot directly observe the 
value of RTP RH. Nonetheless, many estimates of RTP have been reported, but they are not 
based on a structural model of RTP. Most are the results of experimental studies or indirect 
estimates based on other models (e.g., Ramsey growth models) on the assumption that RTP is 
constant. Experiments can give us some information on the RTPs of test subjects, but we should 
not naively use these estimates as the RTP RH in the calculation of the future path of economy 
because they vary widely according to the experimental environments. Furthermore, most of the 
indirect estimates were calculated on the assumption that RTP is constant, which as discussed 
previously, is most likely not the case. The basic problem is that no credible estimation method 
of RTP RH has been established. 
 
5.2  Expectations based on beliefs 
The lack of observable data on RTP RH will significantly hinder households from generating 
rational expectations of the future path of economy. How do households rationally expect their 
future streams of consumption and production and calculate their optimal paths without 
information on RTP RH, which is indispensable as the discount factor? The historical mean of 
RTP RH estimated by long-term data is not consistent with a rational expectation of the future 
stream because RTP is not constant. Without a reliable method for estimating the parameters of 
the structural model, it is impossible for households to generate rational expectations of the 
future path of the economy. 
 An alternative way of estimating expected values of RTP RH is needed, but even if an 
alternative method is utilized, households still have to behave as rationally as possible even in 
an environment of significantly incomplete information. In this situation, household may have 
to use the concept of bounded rationality to make decisions. It is possible that the only 
alternative for a household is to use its “belief” about the RTP RH. The use of a belief does not 
mean that households deviate from rationality; rather, it is the most rational behavior they can 
use in an environment where insufficient information is available. 
 Such a belief is defined in this paper as the range of values of RTP RH within which a 
household believes that the true RTP RH exists. Households utilize the belief in place of Eq. 
(17). More specifically, suppose that household i ( Ni ) believes that the RTP RH in the future 
is situated in the range λi, where the subjective probability density at any point on λi is identical 
(i.e., its distribution shape is uniform). Because households have no information about the shape 
of the distribution, they assume that it is uniform. This supposition means that household i 
believes that λi is stationary. Let iλ be the mean of λi. Suppose that household i calculates its 
optimal future path on the belief that the mean of future values of RTP RH is
iλ . By equation 
(16), W can be calculated based on 
iλ , and the expected future path of economy can be 
calculated. 
 Households can equally access all relevant information. Therefore, if the belief of a 
household is very different from those of the majority, the household will soon perceive that its 
belief is different, through observing the behavior of majority. The household will change its 
belief to the almost same as those of the majority because otherwise it cannot achieve optimality 
as expected on the assumption that sustainable heterogeneity is achieved. Hence, it is likely that 
households’ beliefs become similar, and thereby, it is assumed for simplicity that households’ 
beliefs are identical.  
 Note that households do not cooperatively and collectively expect the future path of 
economy (i.e., the representative household’s future path), but each household independently 
and individually generates its own expectations based on its belief in RTP RH. The household 
thereby creates its own expected future path considering the expected representative 
household’s future path. The aggregates are the sum of all household’s independent and 
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individual activities, but if sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, the aggregates appear to be the 
same as the results of the representative household’s activities. 
 
5.3  Refining beliefs 
A household knows that its expectation is based on its beliefs and not the structural model. 
Therefore, it will always want to refine the belief, that is, raise the probability that the belief is 
the correct value, by exploiting all currently available relevant information. Let a set of 
currently available economic indicators be It (e.g., the observed data on consumption, 
production, inventory, etc.). These data may provide some useful information on the past RTP 
RH, and a household may refine its belief based on this information. These data and Eq. (16) 
can be used to generate estimates of past values of RTP RH. However, It includes noise, and 
data in It will usually be somewhat inconsistent between the elements of It. In addition, because 
Eq. (16) indicates the steady state values that are achieved after a long-period transition, the 
short-term past data included in It are basically insufficient to obtain a credible estimate. 
Therefore, the estimate of the past values of RTP RH based on It and Eq. (16) will usually have 
a large confidence interval. Let 
Iμ  be the estimated past RTP RH and μI be its confidence 
interval of, for example, 95%. Because households can equally access all relevant information, 
assume for simplicity that μI and Iμ are identical for all households. 
 Although a household knows that 
Iμ  is not a credible estimate, has a large confidence 
interval, and is merely an estimate (usually a point estimate) of a past value, it will strive to 
utilize the information derived from
Iμ to refine its beliefs in the future value of RTP RH. 
Usually
Iμ will not be equal to iλ , but the ranges of λi and μI may partly overlap. Household i 
may utilize the information from this partial overlap to refine its belief (i.e., information of how 
λi is different from μI). iI λμ   indicates that the belief iλ  is wrong, Iμ is wrong, both are 
wrong, or both are right if the true past RTP RH is
Iμ but the true future RTP RH is iλ . The 
belief 
iλ  may be wrong because the RTP RH will change in the near future, and Iμ may be 
wrong because the RTP RH changed during the period in which the data were obtained. In 
addition, a household knows that μI is the result of all households’ activities based on their 
beliefs, not on the true value of RTP RH. These uncertainties arise because households cannot 
know the parameters of the structural model. Without using the structural model, household i 
cannot judge whether 
iλ  is wrong, Iμ is wrong, both are wrong, or both are right. As a result, 
household i will not easily adjust its belief from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
 However, it is still likely that information about the difference between λi and μI can be 
used to refine the belief. To extract the useful information, the following rules may be used:  
 
Rule 1: if 
Iμ is included in λi, the belief is not adjusted; otherwise, the belief is adjusted from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
Rule 2: if 
iλ is included in μI, the belief is not adjusted; otherwise, the belief is adjusted from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
Rule 3: if λi and μI overlap at or above a specified ratio, the belief is not adjusted; otherwise, the 
belief is adjusted from 
iλ  to Iμ . 
 
The above rules may be seen as a type of adaptive expectation because μI indicates the past RTP 
RH. However, in the situation where the parameters of the structural model of the RTP RH are 
unknown, it may be seen as rational to utilize the information contained in μI by adopting one of 
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these rules. 
 
5.4  Changing beliefs 
However, it does not seem likely that a household will refine its belief following one of the rules 
shown above because the rules are basically backward looking and will not be adopted as a tool 
for refining the belief if a household is convinced that the RTP RH is temporally variable. The 
belief will only be changed if forward-looking information is available, that is, when a 
household becomes aware of information about the future RTP RH in μI. For example, the 
difference between λi and μI may reflect an unexpected and large positive technology shock that 
occurred after the formation of belief λi. Because the effects of the technology shock will persist 
for long periods in the future, household i will most likely change its belief. In this case, a 
household will not simply refine its belief from 
iλ  to Iμ ; it will change to another value that 
is formed as an entirely new belief. 
 Whether a household changes its belief or not, therefore, will depend not simply on μI 
but on the information the household can extract from μI about the future path of the economy. 
Hence, in some cases, a household will change its belief when new values of μI are obtained, but 
in other cases, it will not, depending on how the household interprets the information contained 
in μI. 
 
5.5  Heuristics 
When a household interprets μI, it may also use heuristic methods, for example, a simplified 
linear reduced form model of RTP RH. Studies of the use of heuristics and bounded rationality 
in this context would be useful for better understanding the interpretation mechanism of μI. 
There are many possible simplified linear reduced form models of RH’s RTP that could be used 
as heuristic methods although most of them may be ad hoc. Even though such reduced form 
models are far less credible than a structural model, they may be utilized as a heuristic method 
of interpreting μI by households. Although these types of models may often result in misleading 
conclusions, they may sometimes provide useful information. For example, if a linear 
correlation between RTP RH and a financial indicator exists, even if it is weak or temporary, 
changes in the financial indicator may contain useful information about changes in the RTP RH. 
Therefore, if a household believes that this correlation exists, it will use this information to 
interpret μI. 
 
5.6  Frequent RTP shocks 
Households must have expected values of RTP RH for sustainable heterogeneity, but as 
previously discussed, the expectations are not based on the structural model but rather on a 
belief that is not guaranteed to generate the correct value. In addition, the belief can be 
influenced by heuristic considerations. These features indicate that the expected values of RTP 
RH will fluctuate more frequently than the intrinsic RTP RH. 
 Households’ expectations of RTP RH will change when the intrinsic RTP RH shifts, for 
example, when new information about shocks on the factors that determine Eq. (16) becomes 
available. For a given θ,   cuE changes if the expectation of future productivity changes. 
Productivity at the macro level will be influenced by scientific technology, financial technology, 
social infrastructure, and other factors. If expectations about these factors in the future changes, 
the expected future productivity and   cuE will also change. In addition, even if intrinsic 
RTP RH does not change, the expected RTP RH will change if a household’s belief is altered 
because of new information contained in μI. Hence, the expected RTP RH can change 
independently of intrinsic changes in RTP RH. Therefore, even if intrinsic changes in RTP RH 
occur infrequently, changes in the expected RTP RH may occur more frequently. 
 A household’s expected RTP RH can potentially change every time new information on 
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μI becomes available if it contains the information that makes beliefs change. Information 
concerning factors that affect the expected RTP RH will become available frequently, and at 
least some of the information may be both very important and unexpected. In addition, there 
will be many disturbances in the fundamental factors that affect Eq. (16), and many of these 
disturbances will also cause μI to change. As discussed previously, a household may interpret 
these changes in μI as a change in the true RTP RH. Therefore, it is likely that households’ 
expected RTP RH change more frequently than the intrinsic RTP RH, and thereby, that time 
preference shocks also occur more frequently than previously thought. 
 Even a small piece of additional information about the belief can significantly change 
the path of the economy. For example, if many households believe a rumor (whether it is true or 
not) related to information about the interpretation of μI and respond similarly to it, their 
expectations will be changed in the same direction by the rumor. If all households respond 
similarly to an untrue rumor and change their expectations equally to an untrue value, the 
economy will proceed based on the incorrect expectation of RTP RH. The
Iμ that is observed a 
few periods later will follow these wrongly expected values of RTP RH. Upon obtaining new 
data of 
Iμ that are consistent with these wrongly expected values, households will judge that 
their (incorrect) changes were in fact correct. As a result, the incorrect expectations become 
self-fulfilling. This spurious situation may reach an impasse at some point in the future because 
the expectations are based not on a structural model but on the (incorrect) beliefs. Households 
will not anticipate the impasse until the economy reaches it because they believe that the 
wrongly expected RTP RH (i.e., the currently held belief) is true. 
 
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper, an alternative definition of the representative household that can be used in 
dynamic models is presented. The alternative definition necessitates that all households must ex 
ante know the RTP RH for them to implement optimizations, otherwise the ex post aggregates 
cannot be consistent with the representative household’s behavior. The need to generate 
expected values of RTP RH produces an important problem. The structural model of RTP RH 
should be known to households for them to rationally generate expectations, but a household 
has almost no information about the true RTP RH because it cannot observe the data of each 
household’s RTP or of the RH’s RTP. Thereby, a household cannot estimate the parameter values 
of the structural model and use the structural model of RTP RH to generate its expected RTP RH. 
It instead must use beliefs. Therefore, households will most likely behave based on bounded 
rationality and use heuristics in this situation. 
 Even if changes in the intrinsic RTP RH do not occur often, changes in the beliefs that 
influence households’ expected values of RTP RH can occur frequently. Additional information 
about factors that affect the belief will constantly become available, and some of the 
information may be very important and unexpected. Therefore, it is likely that the expected RTP 
RH changes more frequently than the intrinsic RTP RH, and thereby, time preference shocks 
occur more frequently than has been previously thought. 
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Figure 1: Endogenous time preference 
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Figure 2: Permanently constant time preference 
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